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RFC 3651 - Handle System Namespace and Service Definition


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Network Working Group                                             S. Sun
Request for Comments: 3651                                     S. Reilly
Category: Informational                                        L. Lannom
                                                                    CNRI
                                                           November 2003

            Handle System Namespace and Service Definition

Status of this Memo

   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
   not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
   memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003).  All Rights Reserved.

IESG Note

   Several groups within the IETF and IRTF have discussed the Handle
   System and it relationship to existing systems of identifiers.  The
   IESG wishes to point out that these discussions have not resulted in
   IETF consensus on the described Handle System nor on how it might fit
   into the IETF architecture for identifiers.  Though there has been
   discussion of handles as a form of URI, specifically as a URN, these
   documents describe an alternate view of how namespaces and
   identifiers might work on the Internet and include characterizations
   of existing systems which may not match the IETF consensus view.

Abstract

   The Handle System is a general-purpose global name service that
   allows secured name resolution and administration over the public
   Internet.  This document provides a detailed description of the
   Handle System namespace, and its data, service, and operation models.
   The namespace definition specifies the handle syntax and its semantic
   structure.  The data model defines the data structures used by the
   Handle System protocol and any pre-defined data types for carrying
   out the handle service.  The service model provides definitions of
   various Handle System components and explains how they work together
   over the network.  Finally, the Handle System operation model
   describes its service operation in terms of messages transmitted
   between client and server, and the client authentication process
   based on the Handle System authentication protocol.

Table of Contents
   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
   2.  Handle System Namespace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Handle System Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       3.1.  Handle Value Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       3.2.  Pre-defined Handle Data Types. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
             3.2.1.  Handle Administrator: HS_ADMIN . . . . . . . . . 10
             3.2.2.  Service Site Information: HS_SITE. . . . . . . . 14
             3.2.3.  Naming Authority Delegation Service:
                     HS_NA_DELEGATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
             3.2.4.  Service Handle: HS_SERV. . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
             3.2.5.  Alias Handle: HS_ALIAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
             3.2.6.  Primary Site: HS_PRIMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
             3.2.7.  Handle Value List: HS_VLIST. . . . . . . . . . . 22
   4.  Handle System Service Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
       4.1.  Handle System Service Components . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
             4.1.1.  Global Handle Registry (GHR) . . . . . . . . . . 23
             4.1.2.  Local Handle Service (LHS) . . . . . . . . . . . 26
       4.2.  Handle System Middle-Ware Components . . . . . . . . . . 27
             4.2.1.  Handle System Caching Service. . . . . . . . . . 27
             4.2.2.  Handle System Proxy Server . . . . . . . . . . . 28
       4.3.  Handle System Client Components. . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   5.  Handle System Operation Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
       5.1.  Handle System Service Request and Response . . . . . . . 30
       5.2.  Handle System Authentication Protocol. . . . . . . . . . 32
   6.  Security Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
   7.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
   8.  References and Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
   9.  Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
   10. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

1.  Introduction

   The Handle System manages handles as globally unique names for
   Internet resources.  It was originally conceived and described in a
   paper by Robert Kahn and Robert Wilensky [22] in 1995.  The Handle
   System provides a general-purpose global name service that allows
   handles to be resolved and administrated securely over the public
   Internet.  The Handle System categorizes its service into two
   categories: the handle resolution service and the handle
   administration service.  Clients use handle resolution service to
   resolve handles into their values.  The handle administration service
   deals with client requests to manage these handles, including adding
   and deleting handles, and updating handle values.

   The document "Handle System Overview" [1] provides an architectural
   overview of the Handle System, and its relationship to other Internet
   services such as DNS [2,3] and LDAP[4].  This document provides a

   detailed description of the Handle System namespace, its data and
   service model, and its operation model.  It assumes that readers are
   familiar with the basic concepts of the Handle System as described in
   the overview document.

   The namespace definition specifies the handle syntax and its semantic
   structure.  The data model defines the data structures used by the
   Handle System protocol and any pre-defined data types for carrying
   out the handle service.  The service model provides definitions of
   various Handle System components and explains how they work together
   over the network.  Finally, the Handle System operation model
   describes its service operation in terms of messages transmitted
   between client and server, and the client authentication process
   based on the Handle System authentication protocol.

2.  Handle System Namespace

   Handles are character strings that may consist of a wide range of
   characters.  Every handle in the Handle System consists of two parts:
   its naming authority, followed by a unique local name under the
   naming authority.  The naming authority and the local name are
   separated by the ASCII character "/" (octet 0x2F).  The following
   table provides the handle syntax definition in ABNF [5] notation:

       <Handle>          = <NamingAuthority> "/" <LocalName>

       <NamingAuthority> = *(<NamingAuthority>  ".") <NAsegment>

       <NAsegment>       = 1*(%x00-2D / %x30-3F / %x41-FF )
                         ; any octets that map to UTF-8 encoded
                         ; Unicode 2.0 characters except
                         ; octets '0x2E' and '0x2F' (which
                         ; correspond to the ASCII characters '.',
                         ; and '/').

       <LocalName>       = *(%x00-FF)
                         ; any octets that map to UTF-8 encoded
                         ; Unicode 2.0 characters

                       Table 2.1: Handle syntax

   As shown in Table 2.1, both <NamingAuthority> and <LocalName> are
   UTF-8 [6] encoded character strings.  The Handle System protocol
   mandates UTF-8 encoding for handles transferred over the wire.  The
   <LocalName> may consist of any characters from the Unicode 2.0
   standard [7].  The <NamingAuthority> may use any characters from the
   Unicode 2.0 standard except the ASCII character '/' (0x2F), which is

   reserved to separate the <NamingAuthority> from the <LocalName>.  A
   <NamingAuthority> may consist of multiple non-empty <NAsegment>s,
   each of which separated by the ASCII character '.' (octet 0x2E).

   Naming authorities are defined in a hierarchical fashion resembling a
   tree structure.  Each node and leaf of the tree is given a label that
   corresponds to a naming authority segment (<NAsegment>).  The parent
   node represents the parent naming authority.  Naming authorities are
   constructed left to right, concatenating the labels from the root of
   the tree to the node that represents the naming authority.  Each
   label (or its <NAsegment>) is separated by the character '.' (octet
   0x2E).  For example, the naming authority for the Digital Object
   Identifier (DOI) project is "10".  It is a root-level naming
   authority as it has no parent naming authority for itself.  It can,
   however, have many child naming authorities.  For example, "10.1045"
   is a child naming authority of "10" for the D-Lib Magazine.

   By default, handles are case sensitive.  However, a handle service,
   global or local, may implement its namespace so that ASCII characters
   under the namespace are treated as case insensitive.  For example,
   the global handle service, formally known as the Global Handle
   Registry (GHR), is implemented such that ASCII characters are treated
   as case insensitive.  Since the GHR manages all handles for naming
   authorities, ASCII characters in naming authorities are treated as
   case insensitive.

3.  Handle System Data Model

   The Handle System provides a name-to-value binding service over the
   public Internet.  Each handle may have a set of values assigned to
   it.  The Handle System maintains the value set of each handle and
   will return it in response to any handle resolution request.  The
   Handle System data model defines the conceptual data structure for
   these values.  The data model used by the protocol may not be the
   exact physical data model used for storage in any specific
   implementation.  Rather, it is the data model followed by the Handle
   System protocol as specified in the "Handle System Protocol
   Specification" [8].

3.1.  Handle Value Set

   Each handle may have a set of values assigned to it.  These handle
   values use a common data structure for its data.  For example, each
   handle value has a unique index number that distinguishes it from
   other values in the value set.  It also has a specific data type that
   defines the syntax and semantics of the data in its data field.
   Besides these, each handle value contains a set of administrative
   information such as TTL and permissions.  Figure 3.1 shows the handle

   "10.1045/may99-payette" with a set of three handle values.  One of
   these values (with index number set to 1) is shown in detail.  (Note
   that the encoding of the length for each field is not shown in Figure
   3.1.  Also, the empty <reference> field consists of a 4-byte integer
   whose value is zero.)

                   Handle "10.1045/may99-payette"

                                |
                                |
                                V

        -------------------------------------------------------------
       |        <index>:            3                                |
      -------------------------------------------------------------  |
     |        <index>:            2                                | |
    -------------------------------------------------------------  | |
   |                                                             | | |
   |  <index>:           1                                       | | |
   |  <type>:            URL                                     | | |
   |  <data>:            http://www.dlib.org/dlib...             | | |
   |  <TTL>:             {Relative: 24 hours}                    | | |
   |  <permission>:      PUBLIC_READ, ADMIN_WRITE                | | |
   |  <timestamp>:       927314334000                            | | |
   |  <reference>:       {empty}                                 | |-
   |                                                             |-
    -------------------------------------------------------------

     Figure 3.1: Handle "10.1045/may99-payette" and its set of values

   In Figure 3.1, it shows a handle value whose its index is set to 1.
   The data type for the handle value is URL.  The URL data as stated in
   the <data> field is "http://www.dlib.org/dlib...".  The TTL (time to
   live) entry suggests that the value record should be cached no more
   than 24 hours before the source of the information to be consulted
   again.  The <permission> field grants anyone permission to read, but
   only the administrator to update the value.  The <reference> field is
   empty.  It may contain a list of references to other handle values as
   credentials for this handle value.

   Thus a handle value may be thought of as a record that consists of a
   group of data fields.  Each of these data fields is defined as
   follows:

      <index>
      An unsigned 32-bit integer that uniquely identifies a handle value
      from other handle values.

      <type>
      A UTF8-string that identifies the data type for the value record.
      Note that throughout this document, a UTF8-string is defined as a
      data structure that consists of a 4-byte unsigned integer followed
      by an UTF-8 encoded character string.  The integer specifies the
      number of octets in the character string.

      The <type> field identifies the data type that defines the syntax
      and semantics of data in the next <data> field.  The data type may
      be registered with the Handle System to avoid potential conflicts.
      The Handle System has a reserved naming authority "0.TYPE" for
      registered data types.  For example, "URL" (as shown in Figure
      3.1) is a registered data type.  It is registered as the handle
      "0.TYPE/URL".  The handle may have a value that explains the
      syntax and semantics of the data type.

      Data types under the Handle System may be hierarchical.  Each
      level of the hierarchy may be named in terms of a UTF8-String with
      no '.' (0x2E) characters.  The '.' character is used to mark the
      boundary between hierarchy levels.  For example, the Handle System
      data type "a.b" may be considered as a sub-type "b" under the type
      "a".  Similarly, handle values of <type> "a.b.x", "a.b.y" and
      "a.b.z" may be considered as handle values under the common type
      hierarchy "a.b".

      For any handle values, the UTF8-string in the <type> field may not
      end with the '.' character.  In other words, no Handle System data
      type should end with the '.' character.  However, the '.'
      character may appear in the end of the <type> parameter in a
      handle query.  This is used to query for all handle values under a
      common type hierarchy.  For example, one may query for all handle
      values under the type hierarchy "a.b" (e.g., handle values of
      <type> "a.b.x", "a.b.y" and "a.b.z") by setting the <type>
      parameter to "a.b.".  Note here that the <type> parameter ends
      with the '.' character.  Details of the handle query operation can
      be found in the Handle System protocol specification [8].

      <data>
      A sequence of octets (preceded by its length in a 4-byte unsigned
      integer) that describes the resource identified by the handle. The
      syntax and semantics of these octets are identified by the <type>
      field.

      <permission>
      An eight-bit bit-mask for access control of the handle value.
      Access control is defined in terms of read, write, and execute

      permissions, applicable to either general public or handle
      administrator(s).  Each handle value can have its permission field
      specified as any combination of the following bits:

        PUBLIC_WRITE   (0x01)     permission that allows anyone to
                                  modify or delete the handle value.

        PUBLIC_READ    (0x02)     permission that allows anyone to read
                                  the handle value.

        ADMIN_WRITE    (0x04)     permission that allows any handle
                                  administrator to update or delete the
                                  handle value.

        ADMIN_READ     (0x08)_    permission that allows the handle
                                  value to be read by any handle
                                  administrator with AUTHORITIVE_READ
                                  privilege.

        PUBLIC_EXECUTE (0x10)     permission that allows anyone to
                                  execute the program identified by the
                                  handle value on the handle host as
                                  anonymous user.  Because of the
                                  security risks this may have brought
                                  up, implementations may choose not to
                                  support such permission, or provide
                                  options so that it can be disabled at
                                  deployment.

        ADMIN_EXECUTE  (0x20)     permission that allows handle
                                  administrator(s) to run the program
                                  identified by the handle value on the
                                  handle server.  The handle server must
                                  authenticate the handle administrator
                                  before executing the program.  The
                                  handle administrator must have an
                                  established account on the handle
                                  server.  The execution of the handle
                                  value should assume the same privilege
                                  as the one given to the account for
                                  the handle administrator.  Because of
                                  the security risks this may have
                                  brought up, implementations may choose
                                  not to support such permission, or
                                  provide options so that it can be
                                  disabled at deployment.

      Note that a handle value with no PUBLIC_READ nor ADMIN_READ
      permission can not leave the handle server.  It may be used, for
      example, to store secret keys for authentication purposes.  A
      handle value with neither PUBLIC_WRITE nor ADMIN_WRITE permission
      makes the handle value immutable and cannot be deleted by any
      handle administrator (via the Handle System protocol).

      The administrator for a given handle must specify the permission
      for each handle value.  Implementations may choose PUBLIC_READ and
      ADMIN_WRITE as the default permission for each handle value.
      Handle servers must check permissions before fulfilling any client
      request.

      <TTL>
      An octet followed by a 4-byte integer that specifies the Time-To-
      Live of the value record.  It is used to describe how long the
      value record can be cached before the source of the information
      should again be consulted.  A zero value for a TTL indicates that
      the value record should only be used for the transaction in
      progress and should not be cached.  Any non-zero TTL is defined in
      terms of a TTL type (specified in the first octet), followed by
      the TTL value (the 32-bit unsigned integer that follows the TTL
      type).  The TTL type indicates whether the TTL value is absolute
      or relative.  The absolute TTL value defines the time to live in
      terms of seconds since 00:00:00 UTC, January 1st 1970.  A relative
      TTL specifies the time to live in terms of the number of seconds
      elapsed since the value was obtained by the client from any handle
      server.

      <timestamp>
      An 8-byte (long) integer that records the last time the value was
      updated at the server.  The field contains elapsed time since
      00:00:00 UTC, January 1970 in milliseconds.  The choice of
      milliseconds is to avoid potential collision when updating the
      value.

      <reference>
      A 4-byte integer followed by a list of references to other handle
      values.  The integer specifies the number of references in the
      list.  Each reference in the list refers to another handle value
      in terms of a UTF8-string and a 4-byte integer (where the UTF8-
      string is the handle name and the integer is the value index).
      References are generally used to add credentials to the current
      handle value.  For example, a handle value may make itself more
      trust-worthy by referring to a digital signature issued by a
      commonly trusted entity.

   By default, the Handle System returns all the handle values with
   public-read permission in response of any resolution request.  It is
   possible for a client to ask for a subset of those values with
   specific data type (e.g., all URLs assigned to the handle).  The
   client may also ask for a specific handle value based on a specific
   value index.

   Each handle value can be uniquely referenced by the combination of
   the handle and its value index.  Care must be taken when changing the
   value index as it may break an existing reference to the handle
   value.  For example, suppose the handle X/Y has a value whose index
   is 1.  That value may be referred to as X/Y:1.  If the handle
   administrator changes the value index from 1 to 2, the reference to
   X/Y:1 will become obsolete.  Any reference to the handle value will
   have to change to X/Y:2.

   Value records assigned to any handle may or may not have continuous
   index numbers.  Nor can it be assumed that the index will start with
   0 or 1.  A handle administrator may assign a handle value with any
   index as long as each index is unique within the value set.

   A handle value may be "privatized" or "disabled" by setting its
   <permission> field as "authorized-read".  This limits read-access to
   the handle administrator only.  The "privatized" value can then be
   used to keep any historical data (on behalf of the handle
   administrator) without exposing it to public.  Such approach may also
   be used to keep any obsolete handle or naming authority from being
   reused accidentally.

3.2.  Pre-defined Handle Data Types

   Every handle value must have a data type specified in its <type>
   field.  The Handle System provides a type registration service that
   allows organizations to register new data types for their
   applications.  Data types can be registered as handles under the
   naming authority "0.TYPE".  For example, the URL data type is
   registered under the Handle System as the handle "0.TYPE/URL".  The
   handle may have a handle value that refers to RFC1738 [9], an IETF
   standard document that defines the syntax and semantics of URL.

   The Handle System pre-defines a set of data types to carry out the
   handle service.  For example, HS_ADMIN is a pre-defined data type
   used to describe handle administrators or administrator groups.
   HS_SITE is a pre-defined data type to describe the service interface
   of any Handle System service component.  The following sections
   provide detailed descriptions of these pre-defined data types under
   the Handle System.

3.2.1.  Handle Administrator: HS_ADMIN

   Each handle has one or more administrators.  Any administrative
   operation (e.g., add, delete or modify handle values) can only be
   performed by the handle administrator with adequate privilege.
   Handle administrators are defined in terms of HS_ADMIN values.  Every
   handle must have at least one HS_ ADMIN value that defines its
   administrator.  Each HS_ADMIN value can be used to define a set of
   handle administrators sharing the same administration privilege.
   Handles with multiple administrators of different privileges may have
   multiple HS_ADMIN values.  HS_ADMIN values are used by the Handle
   System to authenticate handle administrators before fulfilling any
   handle administration request.

   Naming authorities, as described above, are themselves registered as
   handles under the reserved naming authority "0.NA".  These handles
   are referred to as naming authority handles.  Administrators for any
   naming authority are defined as the administrators of the
   corresponding naming authority handle.  For example, "0.NA/10" is the
   naming authority handle for the naming authority "10".  Hence any
   administrator for the naming authority handle "0.NA/10" is also the
   administrator for the naming authority "10".  Naming authority
   administrators are the only ones who can create handles or sub-
   naming authorities under the naming authority.  A sub-naming
   authority may define its own set of administrators to create handles
   or further levels of sub-naming authorities.  For example, the naming
   authority "10.1045" may have a totally different group of
   administrators from its parent naming authority "10".

   An HS_ADMIN value is a handle value whose <type> field is HS_ADMIN
   and whose <data> field consists of the following entries:

      <AdminRef>
      A reference to a handle value.  The reference consists of the
      handle name (a UTF8-string) followed by a 4-byte unsigned integer
      for the handle value index.  The handle value identifies the set
      of administrators for the handle.

      <AdminPermission>
      A 16-bit bit-mask that defines the administration privilege of the
      set of handle administrators identified by the HS_ADMIN value.

   The <AdminRef> entry refers to a handle value that can be used to
   authenticate the handle administrator.  Such handle value is called
   the handle administrator reference.  The handle administrator
   reference may contain the secret key, public key, or X.509
   certificate [10] provided by the handle administrator.  For example,
   the <AdminRef> entry may contain a handle administrator reference

   whose <type> field is DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA and whose <data> field
   contains a DES secret key [11], for use in the Cipher Block Chaining
   (CBC) mode of operation [12, 13].  The secret key can be used by the
   handle server to authenticate the handle administrator.  For stronger
   cryptographic algorithm, the handle administrator reference may
   contain a set of Triple-DES keys [23] and set its <type> to be DES-
   EDE3-WITH-CBC.

   A single handle may be assigned with both the HS_ADMIN value and the
   handle administrator reference.  In other words, the <AdminRef> entry
   may refer to a handle value assigned to the same handle that has the
   HS_ADMIN value.  In this case, authentication of the handle
   administrator does not rely on any other handles.  Alternatively, the
   handle administrator reference may be a handle value under a
   different handle.  Thus HS_ADMIN values from different handles may
   share a common handle administrator reference.  This feature allows
   sharing of handle administrators among different handles.  The handle
   administrator reference contains the secret key, public key, or X.509
   certificate provided by the administrator of these handles.

   Handle administrator reference may be of type HS_VLIST and has its
   <data> field contain a list of references to other handle values.
   Each of these handle values defines a handle administrator reference.
   The HS_VLIST value defines an administrator group.  Each handle
   administrator reference from the HS_VLIST is a member of the
   administrator group.  Each handle value reference is defined in terms
   of a <handle>:<index> pair.  An administrator group may also contain
   other administrator groups as its members.  This allows administrator
   groups to be defined in a hierarchical fashion.  Care must be taken,
   however, to avoid cyclic definition of administrators or
   administrator groups.  Multiple levels of administrator groups should
   be avoided due to their lack of efficiency, but will not be signaled
   as an error.  Client software should be prepared to detect any
   potential cyclic definition of administrators or <AdminRef> entries
   that point to non-existent handle values and treat them as an error.

   A handle can have multiple HS_ADMIN values, each of which defines a
   different handle administrator.  Different administrators can play
   different roles or be granted different permissions.  For example,
   the naming authority handle "0.NA/10" may have two administrators,
   one of which may only have permission to create new handles under the
   naming authority, while the other may have permission to create new
   sub-naming authorities (e.g., "10.1045").  The set of possible
   permissions for a handle administrator is defined as follows:

     Add_Handle (0x0001)
     This permission allows naming authority administrator to create new
     handles under a given naming authority.

     Delete_Handle (0x0002)
     This permission allows naming authority administrator to delete
     handles under a given naming authority.

     Add_NA (0x0004)
     This permission allows the naming authority administrator to create
     new sub-naming authorities.

     Delete_NA (0x0008)
     This permission allows naming authority administrator to delete an
     existing sub-naming authority.

     Modify_Value (0x0010)
     This permission allows handle administrator to modify any handle
     values other than HS_ADMIN values.  HS_ADMIN values are used to
     define handle administrators and are managed by a different set of
     permissions.

     Delete_Value (0x0020)
     This permission allows handle administrator to delete any handle
     value other than the HS_ADMIN values.

     Add_Value (0x0040)
     This permission allows handle administrator to add handle values
     other than the HS_ADMIN values.

     Modify_Admin (0x0080)
     This permission allows handle administrator to modify HS_ADMIN
     values.

     Remove_Admin (0x0100)
     This permission allows handle administrator to remove HS_ADMIN
     values.

     Add_Admin (0x0200)
     This permission allows handle administrator to add new HS_ADMIN
     values.

     Authorized_Read (0x0400)
     This permission grants handle administrator read-access to handle
     values with the ADMIN_READ permission.  Administrators without this
     permission will not have access to handle values that require
     authentication for read access.

     LIST_Handle (0x0800)
     This permission allows naming authority administrator to list
     handles under a given naming authority.

     LIST_NA (0x1000)
     This permission allows naming authority administrator to list
     immediate sub-naming authorities under a given naming authority.

   Administrator permissions are encoded in the <AdminPermission> entry
   in the <data> field of any HS_ADMIN value.  Each permission is
   encoded as a bit flag.  The permission is granted if the flag is set
   to 1, otherwise it is set to 0.

   Figure 3.2.1 shows an example of HS_ADMIN value that defines an
   administrator for the naming authority handle "0.NA/10".  In figure
   3.2.1, a naming authority administrator is identified by an HS_ADMIN
   value assigned to the naming authority handle "0.NA/10".  The
   administrator can be authenticated based on the handle value
   "0.NA/10":3, which is the handle value assigned to the naming
   authority handle "0.NA/10" and has its index set to 3.  The handle
   value "0.NA/10":3 may contain the secret or public key used by the
   administrator.  The administrator is granted permission to add,
   delete, or modify sub-naming authorities under "10", and add or
   delete handles directly under the naming authority.  The
   administrator may also add, delete, or modify any handle values
   assigned to the naming authority handle except those HS_ADMIN values.
   In other words, the administrator is not allowed to add, delete, or
   modify any administrators for the naming authority.

        -------------------------------------------------------------
      -------------------------------------------------------------  |
    -------------------------------------------------------------  | |
   |                                                             | | |
   |  <index>:       2                                           | | |
   |  <type>:        HS_ADMIN                                    | | |
   |  <data>:                                                    | | |
   |    <AdminRef>:    "0.NA/10": 3                              | | |
   |    <AdminPerm>:   Add_NA,     Delete_NA,                    | | |
   |                   Add Handle, Delete_Handle,                | | |
   |                   Add_Value,  Delete_Value,  Modify_Value,  | | |
   |                   Authorized_Read, List_Handle, List_NA     | | |
   |                                                             | | |
   |  <TTL>:         24 hours                                    | | |
   |  <permission>:  PUBLIC_READ, ADMIN_WRITE                    | | |
   |  <reference>:   {empty}                                     | |-
   |                                                             |-
    -------------------------------------------------------------

         Figure 3.2.1: Administrator for the naming authority
                       handle "0.NA/10"

   HS_ADMIN values are used by handle servers to authenticate the handle
   administrator before fulfilling any administrative requests.  The
   server authenticates a client by checking whether the client has
   possession of the secret key (or the private key) that matches the
   one in any of the handle administrator references.  The
   authentication is carried out via the Handle System authentication
   protocol as described later in this document.

   HS_ADMIN values may require authentication for read access in order
   to prevent public exposure of the data.  Additionally, the handle
   administrator reference that contains the administrator's secret key
   should have neither PUBLIC_READ nor ADMIN_READ permission to prevent
   the key from leaving the server.

3.2.2.  Service Site Information: HS_SITE

   The Handle System consists of a single distributed global handle
   service, also known as the Global Handle Registry (GHR), and
   unlimited number of Local Handle Services (LHSs).  Each handle
   service, global or local, may be replicated into multiple service
   sites.  Each service site may consist of multiple server computers.
   Service requests targeted at any handle service can be distributed
   into different service sites, and into different server computers
   within any service site.  Such architecture assures that each handle
   service could have the capacity to manage any large number of handles
   and handle requests.  It also provides ways for each handle service
   to avoid any single point of failure.

   Each handle service, global or local, may provide the same set of
   functions for resolving and administering its collection of handles.
   Handle services differ primarily in that each service is responsible
   for a distinct set of handles.  They are also likely to differ in the
   selection, number, and configuration of their components such as the
   servers used to provide handle resolution and administration.
   Different handle services may be created and managed by different
   organizations.  Each of them may have their own goals and policies.

   A service site typically consists of a cluster of server computers
   residing within a local Internet domain.  These computers work
   together to distribute the data storage and processing load at the
   site.  It is possible, although not recommended, to compose a site
   from servers at widely different locations.  Further, it is even
   possible to compose two different sites from the same set of servers.

   Each service site is defined by an HS_SITE value.  HS_SITE is a
   pre-defined Handle System data type.  An HS_SITE value defines a
   service site by identifying the server computers (e.g., IP addresses)
   that comprise the site along with their service configurations (e.g.,

   port numbers).  HS_SITE values are typically assigned to naming
   authority handles.  The set of HS_SITE values assigned to a naming
   authority handle is called the service information for the naming
   authority.

   The service information is managed by the naming authority
   administrator.  It must reflect the configuration of the handle
   service for the naming authority.  Note that an additional layer of
   indirection, called a service handle, can be used to allow multiple
   naming authorities to reference a single set of HS_SITE values, as
   described later in this document (see section 3.2.3).  Clients of the
   Handle System depend on the service information to locate the
   responsible handle server before they can send their service
   requests.  The service information can also be used by clients to
   authenticate any service response from the handle server.

   An HS_SITE value is a handle value whose <type> field is HS_SITE and
   whose <data> field consists of the following entries:

     <Version>
     A 2-byte value that identifies the version number of the HS_SITE.
     The version number identifies the data format used by the HS_SITE
     value.  It is defined to allow backward compatibility over time.
     This document defines the HS_SITE with version number 0.

     <ProtocolVersion>
     A 2-byte integer value that identifies the handle protocol version.
     The higher byte of the value identifies the major version and the
     lower byte the minor version.  Details of the Handle System
     protocol is specified in [8].

     <SerialNumber>
     A 2-byte integer value that increases by 1 (and may wrap around
     through 0) each time the HS_SITE value gets changed.  It is used in
     the Handle System protocol to synchronize the HS_SITE values
     between client and server.

     <PrimaryMask>
     An 8-bit mask that identifies the primary site(s) of the handle
     service.  The first bit of the octet is the <MultiPrimary> bit.  It
     indicates whether the handle service has multiple primary sites.
     The second bit of the octet is the <PrimarySite> bit.  It indicates
     whether the HS_SITE value is a primary site.  A primary site is the
     one that supports administrative operations for its handles.  A
     <MultiPrimary> entry with zero value indicates that the handle
     service has a single primary site and all handle administration has
     to be done at that site.  A non-zero <MultiPrimary> entry indicates
     that the handle service has multiple primary sites.  Each primary

     site may be used to administrate handles managed under the handle
     service.  Handles managed by such service may identify its primary
     sites using an HS_PRIMARY value, as described in section 3.2.5.

     <HashOption>
     An 8-bit octet that identifies the hash option used by the service
     site to distribute handles among its servers.  Valid options
     include HASH_BY_NA (0x00), HASH_BY_LOCAL (0x01), or HASH_BY_HANDLE
     (0x02).  These options indicate whether the hash operation should
     only be applied to the naming authority portion of the handle, or
     only the local name portion of the handle, or the entire handle,
     respectively.  The standard MD5 hashing algorithm [14] is used by
     each service site to distribute handles among its servers.

     <HashFilter>
     An UTF8-string entry reserved for future use.

     <AttributeList>
     A 4-byte integer followed by a list of UTF8-string pairs.  The
     integer indicates the number of UTF8-string pairs that follow.
     Each UTF8-string pair is an <attribute>:<value> pair.  They are
     used to add literal explanations of the service site.  For example,
     if the <attribute> is "Organization", the <value> should contain a
     description of the organization hosting the service site.  Other
     <attribute>s may be defined to help distinguish the service sites
     from each other.

     <NumOfServer>
     A 4-byte integer that defines the number of servers in the service
     site.  The entry is followed by a list of <ServerRecord>s.  Each
     <ServerRecord> defines a handle server that is part of the service
     site.  Each <ServerRecord> consists of the following data fields:

     <ServerRecord> ::= <ServerID>
                        <Address> <PublicKeyRecord> <ServiceInterface>

     where each field is defined as follows:

         <ServerID>
         A 4-byte unsigned integer that uniquely identifies a server
         process under the service site.  <ServerID>s do not have to
         begin with 1 and they don't have be consecutive numbers.  They
         are used to distinguish servers under a service site from each
         other.  Note that there can be multiple servers residing on any
         given computer, each with a different <ServerID>.

         <Address>
         The 16-byte IPv6 [15, 16] address of the handle server.  Any
         IPv4 address should be presented as :::::FFFF:xxxx:xxxx (where
         xxxx:xxxx can be any 4-byte IPv4 address).

         <PublicKeyRecord>
         A 4-byte integer followed by a byte-array that contains the
         server's public key.  The integer specifies the size of the
         byte-array.  The byte-array (for the publickey) consists of
         three parts: a UTF8-string that describes the key type, a
         two-byte option field reserved for future use, and a byte-array
         that contains the public key itself.  For example, the UTF8-
         String "DSA_PUB_KEY" indicates that the <PublicKeyRecord>
         contains a DSA public key.  The storage format of the DSA key
         in the byte-array could then be found from the handle
         "0.type/DSA_PUB_KEY".  Public key in the <PublicKeyRecord> can
         be used to authenticate any service response from the handle
         server.

         The <PublicKeyRecord> may also contain an X.509 certificate.
         This happens if the key type field contains the UTF8-String
         "CERT.X509".  In this case, "CERT.X509" will map to the handle
         "0.TYPE/CERT.X509".  The handle may contain information that
         describes the syntax and semantics of the public key or its
         certificate.  Additional key type may also be registered (as
         handles under "0.TYPE") to further distinguish different kinds
         of X.509 certificates.  For example, "CERT.X509.DSA" may be
         used to denote X.509 certificates that contain DSA public keys.
         If the key type field of a <PublicKeyRecord> declares
         "CERT.X509.DSA", the <PublicKeyRecord> must contain a X.509
         certificate with a DSA public key in it."

         <ServiceInterface> ::=    <InterfaceCounter>
                                 * [  <ServiceType>
                                      <TransmissionProtocol>
                                      <PortNumber>  ]

         A 4-byte integer followed by an array of triplets consisting of
         <ServiceType, TransmissionProtocol, PortNumber>.  The 4-byte
         integer specifies the number of triplets.  Each triplet lists a
         service interface provided by the handle server.  For each
         triplet, the <ServiceType> is an octet (as a bit mask) that
         specifies whether the interface is for handle resolution
         (0x01), handle administration (0x02), or both.  The
         <TransmissionProtocol> is also an octet (as a bit mask) that
         specifies the transmission protocol.  Possible transmission
         protocols include TCP (0x01), UDP (0x02), and HTTP (0x04).  The

         <PortNumber> is a 4-byte unsigned integer that specifies the
         port number used by the interface.  The default port number is
         2641.

   Figure 3.2.2 shows an example of handle service site in terms of a
   HS_SITE value.  The HS_SITE value is assigned to the naming authority
   handle "0.NA/10".  The <PrimaryMask> indicates that it is the only
   primary site of the handle service.  The site consists of three
   handle servers, as indicated in the <NumOfServer>.  These servers
   provide handle resolution and administration service for every handle
   under the naming authority "10".  The first server record (ServerID
   0) shows two service interfaces, one for handle resolution and the
   other for handle administration.  Each interface has its own port.

   Each server within a service site is responsible for a subset of
   handles managed by the handle service.  Clients can find the
   responsible server by performing a common hash-operation.  The hash-
   operation will first convert all ASCII characters in the handle into
   upper-case.  It then applies the MD5 hashing upon the portion of the
   converted handle string (according to the <HashOption> entry).  The
   result is a 16-byte integer.  The absolute value of the integer will
   be divided by the number of servers (specified in the <NumOfServer>
   entry).  The remainder is the sequence number (starting with zero) of
   the <ServerRecord> listed in the HS_SITE value.  From the
   <ServerRecord>, clients can find the IP address of the handle server
   for their handle requests.

       ------------------------------------------------------------
     ------------------------------------------------------------  |
    -----------------------------------------------------------  | |
   |                                                           | | |
   | <index>:       2                                          | | |
   | <type>:        HS_SITE                                    | | |
   | <data>:                                                   | | |
   |    Version:           0                                   | | |
   |    ProtocolVersion:   2.1                                 | | |
   |    SerialNumber:      1                                   | | |
   |    PrimaryMask:                                           | | |
   |        MultiPrimary:    FALSE                             | | |
   |        PrimarySite:     TRUE                              | | |
   |    HashOption:        HASH_BY_HANDLE                      | | |
   |    HashFilter:        {empty UTF8-String}                 | | |
   |    AttributeList:     0    {followed by no attributes}    | | |
   |    NumOfServer:       3                                   | | |
   |         {followed by a list of <ServerRecord>}            | | |
   |                                                           | | |
   |         -----------------------------------------         | | |
   |       ------------------------------------------ |        | | |
   |      ------------------------------------------ ||        | | |
   |     | ServerID:        1                       |||        | | |
   |     | Address:         :FFFF:132.151.1.155     |||        | | |
   |     | PublicKeyRecord: HS_DSAKEY, iQCuR2R...   |||        | | |
   |     | ServiceInterface                         |||        | | |
   |     |    ServiceType:          Resolution_Only |||        | | |
   |     |    TransmissionProtocol: TCP & UDP       |||        | | |
   |     |    PortNumber:           2641            |||        | | |
   |     |                                          |||        | | |
   |     |    ServiceType:          Admin only      |||        | | |
   |     |    TransmissionProtocol: TCP             ||         | | |
   |     |    PortNumber:           2642            |          | | |
   |      ------------------------------------------           | | |
   |                                                           | | |
   |  <TTL>:        24 hours                                   | | |
   |  <permission>: PUBLIC_READ, ADMIN_WRITE                   | | |
   |  <reference>:  {empty}                                    | |-
   |                                                           |-
    -----------------------------------------------------------

    Fig. 3.2.2: The primary service site for the naming authority "10"

3.2.3.  Naming Authority Delegation Service: HS_NA_DELEGATE

   The HS_NA_DELEGATE is a pre-defined Handle System data type.  It has
   the exact same format as the HS_SITE value.  Like HS_SITE values,
   HS_NA_DELEGATE values are used to describe service sites of a LHS.

   HS_NA_DELEGATE values may be assigned to naming authority handles to
   designate naming authority administration to a LHS.  A naming
   authority handle with a set of HS_NA_DELEGATE values indicates that
   all child naming authorities of the naming authority are managed by
   the LHS described by the HS_NA_DELEGATE values.

   For example, suppose the naming authority "foo.bar" decides to have
   its child naming authorities delegated to a LHS.  To achieve this,
   one may assign the naming authority handle "0.NA/foo.bar" with a set
   of HS_NA_DELEGATE values that describes the LHS.  The set of
   HS_NA_DELEGATE values indicate that the service information of any
   child naming authority of the "foo.bar", such as "foo.bar.baz", can
   be found by querying the naming authority handle "0.NA/foo.bar.baz"
   from the LHS.

3.2.4.  Service Handle: HS_SERV

   Any handle service, global or local, can be defined in terms of a set
   of HS_SITE values.  These HS_SITE values may be assigned directly to
   the relevant naming authority handle, or an additional level of
   indirection may be introduced through the use of service handles.  A
   service handle may be thought of as a name for a handle service.  It
   may be used to maintain the HS_SITE values for the handle service and
   referenced from a naming authority handle via a HS_SERV value.  A
   HS_SERV value is a handle value whose <type> field is HS_SERV and
   whose <data> field contains the reference to the service handle.
   HS_SERV values are typically assigned to naming authority handles to
   refer clients to the responsible handle service.

   Use of service handle allows sharing of service information among
   multiple naming authorities.  It also allows changes to service
   configuration (e.g., adding a new site) to be made in one place
   rather than in every naming authority handle involved.  The mechanism
   may also be used to support service referral from one handle service
   to another for whatever reason.

   A naming authority handle may have no more than one HS_SERV value
   assigned to it, otherwise it is an error.  If a naming authority
   handle has both a list of HS_SITE values and an HS_SERV value, the
   HS_SITE values should be used as the service information for the
   naming authority.

   Service handles can be registered under the reserved naming authority
   "0.SERV".  Handles under "0.SERV" are managed by the GHR. For
   example, the service handle "0.SERV/123" may be created to maintain
   the service information for the handle service that manages handles
   under the naming authority "123" and any of its sub-naming
   authorities.

   Similarly, a service handle "0.SERV/a.b.c" may be created to host the
   service information for the handle service that manages handles under
   the naming authority "a.b.c".

   The use of service handles raises several special considerations.
   Multiple levels of service handle redirection should be avoided due
   to their lack of efficiency, but are not signaled as an error.
   Looped reference of service handles or HS_SERV values that point to
   non-existent service handles should be caught and error conditions
   passed back to the user.

3.2.5.  Alias Handle: HS_ALIAS

   In practice, it is very possible that a digital object may have
   multiple names that will identify the object.  The Handle System
   supports such feature via the pre-defined data type HS_ALIAS.  An
   HS_ALIAS value is a handle value whose <type> field is HS_ALIAS and
   whose <data> field contains a reference to another handle.  A handle
   with a HS_ALIAS value is an alias handle to the handle referenced in
   the HS_ALIAS value.  An alias handle should not have any additional
   handle values other than HS_ALIAS or HS_ADMIN (for administration)
   values.  This is necessary to prevent any inconsistency between a
   handle and its aliases.

   During a handle resolution, a client may get back an HS_ALIAS value.
   This indicates that the handle in question is an alias handle.  The
   client may then retry the query against the handle specified in the
   HS_ALIAS value until final results are obtained.

   The use of alias handle introduces a number of special
   considerations.  For example, multiple levels of aliases should be
   avoided for the sake of efficiency, but are not signaled as an error.
   Alias loops and aliases that point to non-existent handles should be
   caught and error conditions passed back to the user.

   One potential use of alias handle would be to support the transfer of
   ownership of any named resource.  When a resource identified by a
   handle transfers from one organization to another, a new handle for
   the resource may be created.  To avoid inconsistency and any broken
   reference, the handle used before the ownership transfer may be
   changed into an alias handle and point its HS_ALIAS value to the
   newly created handle.

3.2.6.  Primary Site: HS_PRIMARY

   HS_PRIMARY is a pre-defined data type used to designate the primary
   service sites for any given handle.  A handle service with multiple
   primary service sites is called a multi-primary service.  Otherwise

   it is called a single-primary service.  Each handle managed by a
   multi-primary handle service may specify its primary service sites in
   terms of an HS_PRIMARY value.  A HS_PRIMARY value is a handle value
   whose <type> field is HS_PRIMARY and whose <data> field contains a
   list of references to HS_SITE values.  Each of these HS_SITE defines
   a primary service site for the handle.

   There can be at most one HS_PRIMARY value assigned to each handle.
   Otherwise it is an error.  A handle with no HS_PRIMARY value but
   managed by a multi-primary handle service is not an error.  In this
   case, every primary service site of the handle service will also be
   the primary site for the handle.  Handles managed by a single-primary
   handle service do not need any HS_PRIMARY values and any such values
   should be ignored.

3.2.7.  Handle Value List: HS_VLIST

   HS_VLIST is a pre-defined data type that allows a handle value to be
   used as a reference to a list of other handle values.  An HS_VLIST
   value is a handle value whose <type> is HS_VLIST and whose <data>
   consists of a 4-byte unsigned integer followed by a list of
   references to other handle values.  The integer specifies the number
   of references in the list.  The references may refer to handle values
   under the same handle or handle values from any other handles.  Each
   reference is encoded as an UTF8-string followed by a 4-byte unsigned
   integer that identifies the referenced handle and its value index.

   HS_VLIST values may be used to define administrator groups for
   handles.  In this case, each reference in the HS_VLIST defines a
   member of the administrator group and the HS_VLIST value identifies
   the group as a whole.  Client software must be careful, however, to
   avoid cyclic definition of value references.

4.  Handle System Service Model

   The Handle System is a distributed global name service.  It consists
   of a single distributed Global Handle Registry (GHR) and unlimited
   number of Local Handle Services (LHS).  These service components
   provide the name service (both resolution and administration) on
   behalf of Handle System client components.  Handle System client
   components may also choose to use Handle System middle-ware
   components (e.g., the Handle System caching service) for efficiency.
   This section describes these components and their relationships to
   each other.

4.1.  Handle System Service Components

   The Handle System defines a hierarchical service model.  At the top
   level is the single distributed global handle service, also known as
   the Global Handle Registry (GHR).  Underneath the GHR, there can be
   any number of Local Handle Services (LHSs).  Each LHS must be
   registered with the GHR to manage handles under a distinct set of
   naming authorities.  Naming authorities are managed by the GHR via
   naming authority handles (i.e., handles under the naming authority
   "0.NA").  A naming authority handle can also be used to locate the
   service information (in terms of HS_SITE values) that describes the
   handle service responsible for handles under the naming authority.
   From the service information, clients can choose a service site and
   locate the responsible server for their handle requests.

   Handle System service components are scalable and extensible to
   accommodate any large amount of service load.  A handle service,
   global or local, may consist of multiple service sites, replicating
   each other.  Each service site may also consist of a cluster of
   computers working together to serve its respective namespace. Having
   multiple service sites avoids any single point of failure and allows
   load balancing among these service sites.  Using multiple servers at
   any service site distributes the service load into multiple server
   processes and allows less powerful computers to be utilized for the
   name service.

4.1.1.  Global Handle Registry (GHR)

   The Global Handle Registry (GHR) is mainly used to manage naming
   authority handles and to provide service information for every naming
   authority under the Handle System.  The GHR may also be used to
   manage and provide resolution and administration service to non-
   naming-authority handles.  Unlike any LHS, which mostly manages
   handles under a few naming authorities, the GHR is primarily used to
   register naming authorities and provide service information for every
   LHS.  In other words, the GHR is the single root service that
   registers every LHS and provides their service information via the
   use of naming authority handle(s).  Every naming authority under the
   Handle System must be registered under the GHR as a naming authority
   handle.  The naming authority handle provides the service information
   of the handle service that manages all the handles under the naming
   authority.  The service information may be provided in terms of a set
   of HS_SITE values, or an HS_SERV value that refers to a service
   handle, as described earlier.

   The GHR may consist of multiple service sites, each described in a
   HS_SITE value.  These HS_SITE values are assigned to the designated
   naming authority handle "0.NA/0.NA", also called the root handle. The

   root handle is the naming authority handle that maintains the service
   information for GHR.  Top level naming authorities can only be
   created by administrators of the root handle.

   In order to communicate with the GHR, client software needs the GHR
   service information beforehand.  The service information may be
   distributed initially with the client software, or obtained from some
   other secure sources (e.g., postal mail, secure web site, etc.).
   Client software may keep the service information to communicate with
   the GHR until the service information becomes expired (according to
   its TTL).  The GHR must update its service information (assigned to
   the root handle) every time it changes its configuration.  Client
   software with out-dated service information will be notified of the
   update every time it communicates with the GHR.  The GHR must be
   maintained in such a way that any client software with out-dated GHR
   service information can still query the root handle for the latest
   update.

   Fig. 4.1.1 shows the GHR service information in terms of a set of
   HS_SITE values.  The GHR may consist of a number of service sites,
   each described in a HS_SITE value.  The figure shows a GHR service
   site located in US East Coast, as indicated in the <AttributeList>.

       ------------------------------------------------------------
     ------------------------------------------------------------  |
    -----------------------------------------------------------  | |
   |                                                           | | |
   |  <index>:      3                                          | | |
   |  <type>:       HS_SITE                                    | | |
   |  <data>:                                                  | | |
   |    Version:          1                                    | | |
   |    ProtocolVersion:  2.1                                  | | |
   |    SerialNumber:     1                                    | | |
   |    PrimaryMask:                                           | | |
   |            MultiPrimary:    TRUE                          | | |
   |            PrimarySite:     TRUE                          | | |
   |    HashOption:       HASH_BY_HANDLE                       | | |
   |    HashFilter:       {empty UTF8-String}                  | | |
   |    AttributeList:    1                                    | | |
   |        Description:  Service site at US East Coast        | | |
   |    NumOfServer:      3                                    | | |
   |                                                           | | |
   |        ------------------------------------------         | | |
   |       ------------------------------------------ |        | | |
   |      ------------------------------------------ ||        | | |
   |     | ServerID:        1                       |||        | | |
   |     | Address:         :FFFF:132.151.2.150     |||        | | |
   |     | PublicKeyRecord: HS_DSAKEY, iQCuR2Rnw... |||        | | |
   |     | ServiceInterface                         |||        | | |
   |     |    ServiceType:       Resolution & Admin |||        | | |
   |     |    TransmissionProtocol: TCP & UDP       ||         | | |
   |     |    PortNumber:           2641            |          | | |
   |      ------------------------------------------           | | |
   |                                                           | | |
   |  <TTL>:        24 hours                                   | | |
   |  <permission>: PUBLIC_READ, ADMIN_WRITE                   | | |
   |  <reference>:  {empty}                                    | |-
   |                                                           |-
    -----------------------------------------------------------

          Figure 4.1.1: GHR service information

   The GHR and its service information provide an entry point for any
   client software to communicate with the Handle System.  For any given
   handle, client software can query the GHR for its naming authority
   handle.  This will return the service information of the LHS that
   manages every handle under the naming authority.  The service
   information will direct the client software to the handle server
   within the LHS that manages the handle.

4.1.2.  Local Handle Service (LHS)

   A Local Handle Services (LHS) manages handles under given sets of
   naming authorities.  Each naming authority defines a "local"
   namespace that consists of all of the handles under the naming
   authority.  Note that a LHS is not a "local" service in terms of any
   network topology.  It is called a "Local" Handle Service because it
   typically manages a restricted (local) namespace.

   A naming authority is "homed" at a LHS if all handles under the
   naming authority are managed by the LHS.  A LHS may be home to
   multiple naming authorities.  On the other hand, a naming authority
   may only be "homed" at one LHS.  Note that a naming authority may
   also be homed at the GHR.

      ------------------------------------------------------------
     ------------------------------------------------------------  |
    -----------------------------------------------------------  | |
   |  <index>:      3                                          | | |
   |  <type>:       HS_SITE                                    | | |
   |  <data>:                                                  | | |
   |    Version:          1                                    | | |
   |    ProtocolVersion:  2.1                                  | | |
   |    SerialNumber:     1                                    | | |
   |    PrimaryMask:                                           | | |
   |            MultiPrimary:   FALSE                          | | |
   |            PrimarySite:    TRUE                           | | |
   |    HashOption:       HASH_BY_LOCALNAME                    | | |
   |    HashFilter:       {empty UTF8-String}                  | | |
   |    AttributeList:    1                                    | | |
   |        Description:  Local Service for "10"               | | |
   |    NumOfServer:      2                                    | | |
   |        -----------------------------------------          | | |
   |       ----------------------------------------- |         | | |
   |     | ServerID:        1                       ||         | | |
   |     | Address:         :FFFF:132.151.3.150     ||         | | |
   |     | PublicKeyRecord: HS_DSAKEY, iQCuR2R...   ||         | | |
   |     | ServiceInteface:                         ||         | | |
   |     |    ServiceType:     Resolution & Admin   ||         | | |
   |     |    TransmissionProtocol:     TCP & UDP   ||         | | |
   |     |    PortNumber:               2641        |'         | | |
   |      -----------------------------------------'           | | |
   |  <TTL>:        24 hours                                   | | |
   |  <permission>: PUBLIC_READ, ADMIN_WRITE                   | |-
   |  <reference>:  {empty}                                    |-
    -----------------------------------------------------------

               Figure 4.1.2: LHS service information

   Like the GHR, a LHS may also consist of many service sites with each
   site described by an HS_SITE value.  The set of HS_SITE values for
   any LHS may be assigned to a service handle or to the relevant naming
   authority handle(s).  Fig. 4.1.2 shows an example of HS_SITE values
   for a LHS.  These HS_SITE values are assigned to the naming authority
   handle "0.NA/10".  This suggests that the naming authority "10" is
   "homed" at the LHS specified in these HS_SITE values. Clients may
   query the GHR to obtain the service information in order to
   communicate with the LHS.  Administrators of the naming authority
   handle are responsible for maintaining the service information and
   keeping it up to date.

   Note that a LHS may refer its clients to another LHS in response to a
   service request.  This allows the LHS to further distribute its
   service in a hierarchical fashion.

4.2.  Handle System Middle-Ware Components

   Handle System middle-ware components currently include Handle System
   caching servers and Handle System proxy servers.  These Handle System
   middle-ware components are clients to Handle System service
   components, but servers to Handle System client software. Handle
   System middle-ware components are used to provide additional
   interfaces to the basic handle service.  For example, a Handle System
   caching server may be used to share resolution results within a local
   community.  Additionally, a Handle System proxy server can be used to
   bypass any organizational firewall via HTTP tunneling.

4.2.1.  Handle System Caching Service

   Handle System caching service can be used to reduce the network
   traffic between Handle System clients and servers.  Caching handle
   data, including the service information of any LHS, allows re-use of
   information obtained from earlier queries.

   Each handle value contains a <TTL> (Time to Live) field that tells a
   caching service how long the cached value may be regarded as valid.
   A zero-value TTL indicates that the value can only be used for the
   transaction in progress and should not be cached.  A caching service
   may obtain its data directly from a handle service, or from another
   caching service that eventually gets its data from the handle
   service.

   A caching service may be defined in terms of an HS_SITE value and may
   consist of multiple caching servers.  For any given handle, clients
   can find the responsible caching server within the caching service by
   using the same hashing algorithm as used in locating the handle
   server within any handle service.

   Caching services are not part of any Handle System administration or
   authentication hierarchy.  The Handle System protocol does not
   authenticate any response from a caching service.  Clients are
   responsible to set up their trust relationship with the caching
   service that they select.  They will also rely on the caching service
   to properly authenticate any response from any handle server.

4.2.2.  Handle System Proxy Server

   Handle System proxy servers can be used to enable handle resolution
   via other Internet protocols.  For example, CNRI has built and made
   available a Handle System HTTP Proxy Server that will process any
   handle resolution in terms of HTTP protocol.  The current DNS address
   for the proxy server is at "hdl.handle.net".  The proxy server allows
   any handle to be resolved via a HTTP URL.  The URL can be constructed
   as "http://hdl.handle.net/<handle>", where <handle> can be any handle
   from the Handle System.  For example, the handle
   "ncstrl.vatech_cs/tr-93-35" can be resolved via the HTTP URL
   "http://hdl.handle.net/ncstrl.vatech_cs/tr-93-35" from any web
   browser.  In this case, the URL is sent to the proxy server in terms
   of a HTTP request.  The proxy server will query the Handle System for
   the handle data and return the results in terms of HTTP response.

   Using HTTP URLs allows handles to be resolved from standard web
   browsers without any additional client software.  However, such
   reference to the handle also ties itself to the proxy server.  If the
   proxy server changes its DNS name or otherwise becomes invalid, the
   reference (i.e., the HTTP URL) to the handle will break.  Thus the
   selection or use of proxy server should be carefully evaluated.

   Proxy servers are not part of any Handle System administration or
   authentication hierarchy.  The Handle System protocol does not
   authenticate any response from a proxy server.  Clients are
   responsible to set up their trust relationship with the proxy server
   that they select.  They will also rely on the proxy server to
   properly authenticate any response from any handle server.

4.3.  Handle System Client Components

   Handle System client components are client software that communicates
   with the Handle System service components.  Client software may speak
   the Handle System protocol and send its request directly to a service

   component.  The response from the service component may be the final
   answer to the request, or a referral to another service component.
   The client software will have to follow the referral in order to
   complete the transaction.

   Client software may also be configured to tunnel its request via a
   middle-ware component.  The middle-ware component will thus be
   responsible for obtaining the final result and returning it to the
   client.  Unlike service components, middle-ware components will only
   return final results of client's request.  No service referral will
   be returned from middle-ware components.

   Various Handle System client components may be developed for various
   applications.  The CNRI Handle System Resolver [17] is one such
   component.  The resolver extends web browsers (e.g., Netscape or
   Microsoft Internet Explorer) in such a way that handles can be
   resolved directly in terms of "hdl:" Uniform Resource Identifiers
   (URIs).  The Grail web browser [18], a freely downloadable software
   developed in Python [19], also supports the "hdl:" URI scheme and
   will resolve handles accordingly.  For example, the handle
   "10.1045/july95-arms" may be resolved by entering its handle URI as
   "hdl:10.1045/july95-arms" into any of these resolver-enabled
   browsers.  Details of the handle URI syntax will be specified in a
   separate document.

5.  Handle System Operation Model

   Handle System operations can be categorized into resolution and
   administration.  Clients use the handle resolution service to query
   for any handle values.  Handle administration allows clients to
   manage handles, including adding and deleting handles, and updating
   their values.  It also deals with naming authority administration via
   naming authority handles.  This section explains how various Handle
   System components work together to accomplish these service
   operations.

   Both resolution and administration may require authentication of the
   client.  The authentication can be done via the Handle System
   authentication protocol described later in this section.  Whether
   authentication is required or not depends on the kind of operation
   involved and the permissions assigned to the relevant handle value,
   and policies deployed by the relevant service components.

   The Handle System protocol specifies the syntax and semantics of each
   message exchanged between Handle System clients and its server
   components.  This section provides a high level overview of the

   protocol used to accomplish any service operation.  The exact
   programmatic detail of each message (i.e., their byte layout or
   syntax) is specified in a separate document [8].

5.1.  Handle System Service Request and Response

   The Handle System provides its service in response to client
   requests.  A client may send a request to any handle server to
   provoke a response.  The response either provides an answer to the
   request, or a status code with associated information that either
   refers the request to another service component, asks for client
   authentication, or signals some error status.

   Each handle under the Handle System is managed by its home service.
   The naming authority handle provides the service information (in
   terms of HS_SERV or HS_SITE values) of the handle service that
   manages all handles under the naming authority.  Any handle request
   must be directed to the home service of the handle in question.
   Clients may find the home service by querying the corresponding
   naming authority handle against the GHR.  Alternatively, this
   information may be found in a local cache or even be part of a local
   client configuration.  Given the service information, clients may
   select a service site and locate the responsible handle server within
   the site.

   To resolve the handle "ncstrl.vatech_cs/te-93-35", for example,
   client software needs to know the home service for the naming
   authority "ncstrl.vatech_cs".  The home service can be obtained by
   querying the naming authority handle "0.NA/ncstrl.vatech_cs" against
   the GHR.  The GHR will return the service information in terms of the
   HS_SITE values assigned to the naming authority handle.  From the
   service information, clients can pick a service site, find the
   responsible handle server within the site, and send the resolution
   request to the handle server.

   Clients may require digital signatures from a handle server in order
   to authenticate any response from the server.  The signature can be
   generated using the server's private key.  Clients may verify the
   signature using the public key available from the service information
   (refer to the <PublicKeyRecord> entry discussed in 3.2.2).

   A communication session may also be established between any client
   and handle server.  Each session is identified by a unique session ID
   managed by the server.  A session may be used to manage requests that
   require multiple interactions.  It may also be used to share any TCP
   connection or authentication information among multiple service
   transactions.  Each session may establish a session key and use it to

   authenticate any message exchanged within the session.  It may also
   be used to encrypt any message between the client and the server to
   achieve data confidentiality.

   The following diagram shows a handle resolution process in terms of
   messages exchanged between client software and Handle System service
   components.  In this case, the client is trying to resolve the handle
   "ncstrl.vatech_cs/tr-93-35".  It assumes that the client has yet
   obtained the service information of the LHS "homed" by the naming
   authority "ncstrl.vatech.cs".  The client has to get the service
   information from the naming authority handle managed by the GHR.  The
   service information allows the client to locate the responsible LHS
   and query for the handle value.

   [HS Client]  ----------------------------> [Global Handle Registry]
                 1. ask for the service
                    information from the
                    naming authority handle
                    "0.NA/ncstrl.vatech_cs"

   [HS Client]  <---------------------------- [Global Handle Registry]
                 2. service information for
                    the naming authority
                    "ncstrl.vatech_cs"

   [HS Client]  ----------------------------> [Local Handle Service]
                 3. query the handle
                    "ncstrl.vatech_cs/tr-93-35"
                    against the responsible
                    handle server

     \... ...

    (optional client authentication, depending on the service request)

     \... ...

   [HS Client]  <---------------------------- [Local Handle Service]
                  4. query result from the handle
                     server + (optional) server
                     signature

               Figure 5.1: Handle resolution example

   In Figure 5.1, the client is configured to communicate with the GHR
   for any handle service.  In this case, the client first queries the
   GHR to find the home service for the handle's naming authority.  The

   GHR returns the service information of the LHS that manages every
   handle under the naming authority.  From the service information, the
   client can find the responsible handle server and query the server
   for the handle.  The server may set up a session to authenticate the
   client if any of the handle value requires authentication.
   Otherwise, the server will simply return the handle value to the
   client.  The server may send a digital signature as part of its
   response if required by the client.

   The above procedure assumes that the client software already has the
   GHR service information.  That information was likely obtained from
   the client software distribution.  The GHR will notify the client
   software if it learns that the service information used by the client
   software is out of date.  Client software may retrieve the latest
   service information from the root handle "0.NA/0.NA". The root handle
   also maintains the public key that may be used to authenticate the
   service information.

   Note that a client may cache the service information of any naming
   authority so that subsequent queries for handles under the same
   naming authority may reuse the service information and bypass the
   first two steps shown in Figure 5.1.  Client software may also be
   configured to query a caching or proxy server directly for any
   handle.  In this case, the caching or proxy server will act as the
   [HS Client] in Figure 5.1 before returning the query result to the
   client.

   Client software under certain organization may also elect to bypass
   the GHR and communicate directly with a LHS managed by the
   organization.  Doing so may achieve quicker response for handles
   managed under the LHS.  The client software will be referred to the
   GHR for handles not managed by the LHS.

5.2.  Handle System Authentication Protocol

   The Handle System supports handle administration over the public
   Internet.  Access controls can be defined on each handle value.  The
   Handle System authentication protocol is the protocol used by any
   handle server to authenticate handle administrator upon any
   administration request.  The authentication is also necessary when
   clients query for handle values that are read-only by the handle
   administrator.  Handle administration include adding, deleting or
   modifying handle values, and adding or deleting handles.  Naming
   authority administrations are carried out as handle administrations
   over the corresponding naming authority handles.

   The Handle System authentication protocol does not perform any server
   authentication.  However, a client may authenticate any server
   response by asking the server to sign its response with digital
   signature.

   By default, the Handle System authenticates clients via a challenge-
   response protocol.  That is, after receiving a client's request, the
   server issues a challenge to the client if authentication is
   necessary.  To be authenticated as the administrator, the client has
   to return a challenge-response, a message that demonstrates
   procession of the administrator's secret. The secret may be the
   private key or the secret key of the administrator.  This challenge-
   response allows the server to authenticate the client as the handle
   administrator.  Upon successful authentication, the server will
   fulfill the client's request if the administrator is given sufficient
   permission.

   For example, suppose a client sends a request to the handle server to
   add a new handle value.  The server will issue a challenge to the
   client in order to authenticate the client as one of the handle
   administrators.  If the client possesses the private key of the
   administrator, she can use it to sign the server's challenge and
   return the signature as part of her challenge-response.  The server
   will validate the signature in order to authenticate the client. The
   client will be notified if the validation fails.  Otherwise, the
   server will further check if the administrator has the permission to
   add the handle value.  If so, the server will add the handle value
   and report success to the client.  Otherwise, a permission-denied
   message will be returned.

   The following diagram shows a typical authentication process in terms
   of the messages exchanged between the client and the handle server.

     [Client]  -------------------------------->  [Handle Server]
                 1. client request
                  + (optional) client credential

     [Client]  <--------------------------------  [Handle Server]
                 2. server's challenge to client
                  + (i.e., nonce + MD5 of client request)

     [Client]  ------------------------------->   [Handle Server]
                 3. reference to handle administrator
                  + challenge-response from client

     [Client]  <-------------------------------   [Handle Server]
                 4. server acknowledgement

           Figure 5.2: Handle System authentication process

   In Figure 5.2, the client sends an administration request to the
   handle server (along with optional credential discussed later).  The
   server decides that client authentication is required and issues a
   challenge to the client.  The client identifies itself as a handle
   administrator and returns the challenge-response to the server.  The
   server authenticates the client as the administrator based on the
   challenge-response.  It also checks to see if the administrator is
   authorized for the administration request.  If so, the server will
   fulfill the request and acknowledge the client.

   Handle servers must authenticate the client before fulfilling any
   request that requires administrator privilege.  The exact
   authentication process varies depending on whether public key or
   secret key is used by the administrator.  It also depends on whether
   the handle used to store the administrator's key is managed by the
   same handle server or not.

   When public key is used, the challenge-response from the client
   contains its digital signature over the server's challenge.  The
   server can authenticate the client by verifying the digital signature
   based on the administrator's public key.  If secret key is used, the
   challenge-response from the client carries the Message Authenticate
   Code (MAC) generated using the secret key.  The server may
   authenticate the client by generating the same MAC using the
   administrator's secret key and comparing it against the challenge-
   response.

   The reference to handle administrator in Fig 5.2 is also called a
   key-reference.  It refers to a handle value that contains the key
   used by the administrator.  If the key-reference is managed by the
   same handle server (e.g., a handle value assigned to the same
   handle), the server may use the key directly to do the
   authentication.  If the key-reference is managed by some other handle
   server (whether or not within the same handle service), the server
   will have to send a verification-request to this other handle server,
   call it the key-server, in order to authenticate the client.  The
   verification-request to the key-server carries both the server's
   challenge and the client's challenge-response.  The key-server will
   return a verification-response, signed using the key-server's private
   key.  The content of the verification-response will depend on the
   handle value referenced by the key-reference.  If the key-reference
   refers to a public key used by the administrator, the verification-
   response will contain the public key of the administrator.
   Otherwise, the key-server will verify the challenge-response on
   behalf of the requesting server and return the result in the
   verification-response.  The following diagram shows the control flow
   of the authentication process where the key-reference refers to a
   handle value that contains the administrator's public (or secret) key
   and the key-server is some other handle server.

      --------                                     -------------
     |        |   1. client request.              |             |
     |        | ------------------------------->  |             |
     |        |                                   |             |
     |        |   2.  session ID                  |             |
     |        |     + server's challenge          |             |
     | Handle | <-------------------------------  | Handle      |
     | System |                                   | server      |
     | client |   3.  session ID                  | receiving   |
     |        |     + response to the challenge   | client      |
     |        |     + administrator reference     | request     |
     |        | --------------------------------> |             |
     |        |                                   |             |
     |        |   6.  server acknowledgement      |             |
     |        | <-------------------------------  |             |
      --------                                     -------------
                                                       |  ^
                                       4. Verification |  | 5. verifi-
                                          request      |  |    cation
                                                       |  |    response
                                                       |  |    (signed)
                                                       V  |
                                            --------------------------
                                           | The handle server (the   |
                                           | key-server) that manages |
                                           | the key referenced by    |
                                           | the key-reference        |
                                            --------------------------

          Figure 5.3: Authentication process requiring verification
                      from a second handle server

   Secret key based authentication via a second handle server, i.e., the
   key server, provides a convenient way to share a common secret key
   (e.g., pass phrase) among handles managed by different handle
   servers.  However, it should not be used to manage highly sensitive
   handles or handle data.  The authentication process itself is
   expensive and relies on a third party, i.e., the key-server, for
   proper operation.  Additionally, the secret key itself is subject to
   dictionary attack since the key-server cannot determine whether the
   verification-request comes from a legitimate handle server.  A handle
   service may set its local policy so that secret key based
   authentication can only be carried out if the handle server
   (receiving the client request) is also the key-server.

   Local handle services may define additional local policies for
   authentication and/or authorization.  Handle System service
   components may also choose to use other Internet authentication
   mechanisms such as Kerberos [20] or some Transport Layer Security
   protocol [21].  Details of these will be addressed in a separate
   document.

6.  Security Considerations

   Handle System security considerations are discussed in the "Handle
   System Overview" [1] and that discussion applies equally to this
   document.

   The Handle System delegates handle administration to each handle
   administrator who may or may not be the server administrator.  Handle
   administrators are allowed to choose their own public/secret keys
   used for authentication.  The security of Handle System
   authentication depends on the proper key selection and its
   maintenance by the handle administrator.  Handle administrators must
   choose and protect their authentication keys carefully in order to
   protect the handle data.  Handle server implementations may deploy
   policies that regulate the selection of public/secret keys used for
   authentication.  For example, a handle server may require that any
   authentication key must be no less than certain number of bits.  It
   may also prohibit the use of secret keys because of the potential
   dictionary attack.

   The Handle System data model supports execution permission
   (PUBLIC_EXECUTE, ADMIN_EXECUTE) for each handle value.  While this
   allows better sharing of network resources, it also raises many
   security considerations.  Execution privilege should be restricted
   within the permissions of certain user account (corresponding to the
   handle administrator) on the server to prevent system-wide
   disruption.  Switching between computing platforms for the server
   should also be careful to avoid any unexpected behavior.
   Implementations may choose not to support the execution permission,
   or provide options so that it can be disabled.

   To protect against any irresponsible use of system resource, handle
   servers may implement quota control.  The quota control can be used
   to put limits on the number of handles under a naming authority, the
   number of handle values allowed for any given handle, the maximum
   size of any handle value, and the number of sub-naming authorities
   under a naming authority.  Handle servers must report error if the
   result of a handle administration violates any of these limits.

7.  Acknowledgements

   This work is derived from the earlier versions of the Handle System
   implementation. The overall digital object architecture, including
   the Handle System, was described in a paper by Robert Kahn and Robert
   Wilensky [22] in 1995. Development continued at CNRI as part of the
   Computer Science Technical Reports (CSTR) project, funded by the
   Defense Advanced Projects Agency (DARPA) under Grant Number MDA-972-
   92-J-1029 and MDA-972-99-1-0018.  Design ideas are based on those
   discussed within the Handle System development team, including David
   Ely, Charles Orth, Allison Yu, Sean Reilly, Jane Euler, Catherine
   Rey, Stephanie Nguyen, Jason Petrone, and Helen She.  Their
   contributions to this work are gratefully acknowledged.

   The authors also thank Russ Housley (housley@vigilsec.com), Ted
   Hardie (hardie@qualcomm.com), and Mark Baugher (mbaugher@cisco.com)
   for their extensive review and comments, as well as recommendations
   received from other members of the IETF/IRTF community.

8.  References and Bibliography

   [1]  Sun, S. and L. Lannom, "Handle System Overview", RFC 3650,
        November 2003.

   [2]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities," STD
        13, RFC 1034, November 1987.

   [3]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Implementation and
        Specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [4]  Wahl, M., Howes, T. and S. Kille, "Lightweight Directory Access
        Protocol (v3)", RFC 2251, December 1997.

   [5]  Crocker, D., Ed. and  P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
        Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997.

   [6]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, A Transform Format for Unicode and
        ISO10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.

   [7]  The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version 2.0",
        Addison-Wesley Developers Press, 1996.  ISBN 0-201-48345-9

   [8]  Sun, S., Reilly, S. and L. Lannom, "Handle System Protocol (ver
        2.1) Specification", RFC 3652, November 2003.

   [9]  Berners-Lee, T., Masinter, L. and M. McCahill, "Uniform Resource
        Locators (URL)", RFC 1738, December 1994.

   [10] Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W. and D. Solo, "Internet X.509
        Public Key Infrastructure - Certificate and Certificate
        Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, April 2002.

   [11] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB)
        46-1, Data Encryption Standard, Reaffirmed 1988 January 22
        (supersedes FIPS PUB 46, 1977 January 15).

   [12] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB)
        81, DES Modes of Operation, 1980 December 2.

   [13] Balenson, D., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:
        Part III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers", RFC 1423,
        February 1993.

   [14] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321, April
        1992.

   [15] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
        Specification", RFC 1883, December 1995.

   [16] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
        Architecture", RFC 2373, July 1998.

   [17] CNRI Handle System Resolver, http://www.handle.net/resolver

   [18] Grail browser home page, http://grail.sourceforge.net/

   [19] Python language website, http://www.python.org/

   [20] Kohl, J. and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network Authentication
        Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993.

   [21] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC
        2246, January 1999.

   [22] R. Kahn, R. Wilensky, "A Framework for Distributed Digital
        Object Services, May 1995, http://www.cnri.reston.va.us/k-w.html

   [23] American National Standards Institute.  ANSI X9.52-1998, Triple
        Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation. 1998.

9.  Authors' Addresses

   Sam X. Sun
   Corporation for National Research Initiatives (CNRI)
   1895 Preston White Dr., Suite 100
   Reston, VA 20191

   Phone: 703-262-5316
   EMail: ssun@cnri.reston.va.us

   Sean Reilly
   Corporation for National Research Initiatives (CNRI)
   1895 Preston White Dr., Suite 100
   Reston, VA 20191

   Phone: 703-620-8990
   EMail: sreilly@cnri.reston.va.us

   Larry Lannom
   Corporation for National Research Initiatives (CNRI)
   1895 Preston White Dr., Suite 100
   Reston, VA 20191

   Phone: 703-620-8990
   EMail: llannom@cnri.reston.va.us

10.  Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003).  All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
   included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
   developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
   copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
   followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
   English.

   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assignees.

   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
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Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.

 

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